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Keith R. Evans* Canadian East Coast Offshore Oil and Gas
Industry: Sustainable Development Through
Cooperative Federalism
For many years, development of the oil and gas potential off the east coast of
Canada was delayed while the jurisdictional issues in respect of the area were
resolved. While the provinces lost the major court battles on jurisdiction, political
pressures combined with practical aspects of provincial involvement in the land
bases for operations in the offshore area have resulted in pragmatic cooperation
between the two levels of government and the establishment of joint administrative
Boards to oversee exploration and development in the area. This paper explores
the background to and the mechanics used for this pragmatic constitutional
resolution and, in the context of certain specific exploration and development
issues, addresses how the cooperative effort is implemented by the relevant Board
and the two levels of government in an attempt to achieve sustainable development
of the offshore area
La mise en valeur du potentiel en hydrocarbures de Ia cote Est du Canada a dtd
retardde pendant de nombreuses annees en attendant que soient rdsolues les
questions de competence terntoriale. M~me si les provinces ont perdu les grandes
batailles juridiques sur ces questions, les pressions politiques et les aspects
pratiques de la participation des provinces relativement aux bases terrestres
des operations en zone extracOtiere ont eu comme resultat une collaboration
pragmatique entre les deux ordres de gouvernement et la crdation dinstances
administratives mixtes, les Offices. pour superviser l'exploration et la mise en
valeur des ressources dans la rogion. Lauteur de ce document 6tudie le contexte
et les moyens qui ont 60 employds pour arriver 4 cette solution constitutionnelle
pragmatique En outre, pour ce qui est de certaines questions relatives A
1'exploration et a la mise en valeur, l explique comment /'Office competent et les
deux ordres de gouvernement collaborent pour tenter d'assurer le d~veloppement
durable de la zone extracOtire
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada.
150 The Dalhousie Law Journal
hlIIIIdllton
I. Comstitutional Auithoriti over the Ea.'t Coast Offshore
II. .4hninistration oflthe N.'ui' Scotia O!ffhow. Area
Ill. The Canada-Nwvo Scotia Benefits Plan
I \ Environmental Ascsssnent Requirements
V Fisheries Protection Requirements
V!, M1 arine Pv lct(td ,Arcva
Conchsion
Introduction
For many years, development of the oil and gas potential off the east coast
of Canada was delayed while the jurisdictional issues in respect of the area
were resolved. While the provinces lost the major court battles onjurisdic-
tion, political pressures combined % ith practical aspects of provincial
inolvement in the land bases for operations in the offshore area have
resulted in pragmatic cooperation between the tmo levels of government
and the establishment of joint administrative Boards to oversee explora-
tion and development in the area. This paper explores the background to
and the mechanics used for this pragmatic constitutional resolution and, in
the context of certain specific exploration and development issues,
addresses how the cooperative effort is implemented by the relevant Board
and the two levels of government in an attempt to achieve sustainable
de\elopment of the offshore area.
I. Constitutional Authorit' over the East Coast Oflfhore
International law concepts conferring coastal states with economic rights
o\ er offshore areas postdates the establishment of Canada and the promul-
gation of its constitution in 1867. As a result, constitutional authority within
Canada to legislate with respect to the exploration for and exploitation of
mineral resources differs depending on whether the location in question is
onshore or offshore.
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The provinces have clear constitutional authority with respect to oil
and gas activities conducted within the province:
1. All lands, mines, minerals and royalties belonging to the several
provinces at the time of their confederation with Canada continue
to belong to the province in question.'
2. The provinces are also granted the power within Canada to
legislate in respect of property and civil rights in the province.-
Canadian law clearly establishes that mineral rights under the land
are a property right tr the owner of the land' and hence subject to
provincial jurisdiction under this head of provincial power.
3. Ancillary rights for the provinces in respect of the regulation of the
onshore industry are found in the provincial constitutional right to
make law s with respect to the management and sale of public lands,'
and the provincial general power in respect of all matters of a local
or private nature."
4. A constitutional amendment in 1982 confirmed the power of the
provincial legislatures to make laws in relation to the exploration
for non-renewable natural resources within a province, and for the
development, conservation and management of such resources.'
By contrast, the right to explore and exploit mineral resources in the sea-
bed below offshore waters has been held by the Supreme Court of Canada
to stem from the sovereign rights of the coastal state' as recognized in
recent international law developments (such as the 195$ Geneva Cmnvel-
tion on the Continental Shelf '). and not from the proprietary land rights
I. Constitution .4 Ci, 16"L'K.i) 3.ti& 31 Vict..c.3,%. I IU. reprinted in R.S.C. 185.App I1, N.
i and its relevant counterparts a, additional provinces entered confederation after I NO 7 (Cris.win-
tion.4Act, i861
2. Ibid. at s. 92113 j.
3. Bornxv, CanadianPacilfi RaildyuCoainpanyf1953. 7 A WR. (N S 54h. [145312 DL R. 65
(P.C.): Prism Petroleum Ltd. 1: Onwca Hydncarhn Lid (I4441. 14Y AR. 177, [1q4l 6 VWR.
585 (Alta. C A. i. See the review of thew, and other cases on this i.uc by Vin Pemck, -Legal Frame-
work in The Canadian Offshore" ISpring. 2001i 124 Dalhousie L.J. I.
4 Constitution 4 E. 7. supra note I at %. 92(5p.
5. Ibid. at s. 9216).
6. The Constitution Act, 19,92. being Schedule B to the Canada -i lW.12 WIL K.), 1982. c. I I
added N. 92A to the Constitution Act. iA67.
7. In Reference re- Seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf oltlvhore Neiwfoundland, [ 1984] I
S.CR. 86, (1984). 5 D.L.R. (4' ) 385 1S.C.C.i [Hibernia reference].
8. 29 April 1958,. 499 U.N.T.S. 311, 15 U.ST. 471. Under Article 211) of the (onvention the
coastal state is noted as ha% ing foreign rights ocr the shelf fir the purpose of exploring for and
exploiting natural resources found there - a concept which i. carried forward in Article 77() of the
1982 United Nations Conventon on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 U.N.TS, 3, 21
.L M, 1261. The Oceans 4ct, S.C. 1996, c. 3 .!, . i8 confirms Canada's claim over the shelf adjacent
to Canadian territory for the purpose of exploring and exploiting natural resources in the seabed and
subsoil thereof.
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from which onshore jurisdiction has developed. By the time these offshore
rights were recognized in international law. the sovereign state to which
they were attached was Canada, and not its constituent provinces, giving
Canada and not Newfoundland (or by extension, Nova Scotia), exclusive
jurisdiction over the continental shelf. Similar reasoning had been applied
earlier by the Supreme Court in finding that Canada, and not British Co-
lumbia, enjoyed both territorial sea and continental shelf rights off Canada's
west coast, on the basis that those rights were recognized by international
law as being enjoyed by a state possessing extraterritorial sovereignty.9
In the case of Newfoundland, the Hibernia Reference did not address
the jurisdiction of the three-mile territorial sea around the province. An
earlier Court of Appeal case had ruled in Newfoundland's favour on the
question of jurisdiction oN er the three-mile limit, using Newfoundland's
brief independent status prior to joining Canada and the Terms 9f Union
with Canada as the basis for that decision."' While certain aspects of that
decision were criticised b\ the Supreme Court of Canada in the Hibernia
Reference, the earlier Court of Appeal decision stands at the moment.
The Nova Scotia offshore jurisdiction has not been judicially settled.
However, as Nova Scotia was one of the initial provinces which formed
Canada in 1867. long before sovereign rights were recognized in the con-
tinental shelf area, it is unlikely that it would be in a better position than
Newfoundland in this regard. In fact, after a review of the legal arguments
which would be relevant to the Nova Scotia context, one author concludes:
By the reasoning of the Supreme Court ... and taking into account the
circumstances of the pre-confederation colony of Nova Scotia, it will be
virtually impossible to escape the conclusion that Canada, not Nova Scotia.
holds the proprietary rights and legislati e powers in the territorial sea
and continental shelf off Nova Scotia."
With such clear court recognition of exclusive federal constitutional juris-
diction in the offshore area, it is perhaps odd that this paper deals with
Y In Rvliv rt- Re: irnr'hap qi (lilSho, .Minerai R (ghts 8rfm1h Columbia), [1967] S.C.R. 792.
It In Renovnce Re: l,,hmiW and Natural Resomev afthe Continental Shetf ,IVld) (1983), 41
Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 271, (1983) 145 D.L.R. (3d) 9 (Nfld. CAi,
II. Van Pnick. supra note 3 at 15. Contrary to Mr. Penick's view. it may be that Nova Scotia has
a basis for legislative jurisdiction in respect of areas in the Bay of Fundy and other bays and coastal
area,. but the nature and strength of, and likely outcome in respect of, these claims need not be
reviewed here (although see text accompanying note 73, infra). as the joint jurisdictional approach
in respect of all east coast coastal waters, and as outlined herein, makes the issue redundant in this
contct
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sustainable development through cooperative federalism. Notwithstand-
ing clear federal jurisdiction oN er the area (other than the possible three-
mile territorial sea around Newfoundland and Nova Scotia's yet to be
judicially determined status in respect of its territorial sea and coastal bays),
joint governmental cooperation is needed due to the fact that it is virtually
impossible to develop offshore resources without using land bases in
Newfoundland and NoN a Scotia. In respect of such land operations, the
provincial governments involved would exercise quite considerable
constitutional authority. Unless the governments cooperated to achieve de-
velopment, the huge private inestment necessary would not have been
readily forthcoming. In addition, there were huge political factors at play
in this area. The provinces of Nc%% foundland and Nova Scotia are among
the poorest in Canada, and it was considered politically unacceptable to
deny them involvement in and the economic benefit from natural resources
which, had they been land based. would have been exclusively theirs to
develop and regulate.
As a result. during the I Nts. the goN ernment of Canada, and the
provincial governments in Nova Scotia and Ncwfoundland, negotiated and
executed cooperative agreements -which allowed power and revenue shar-
ing in the development of their respective offshore areas'" and created the
stability required to attract priate exploration and development funding.
These agreements culminated in two sets of reciprocal legislation, namely
the Canada-.Veu ondland and Labrador.4tlantic Accord Iplementation
.4ct 4 (federally) and the Canada-.Vewfbundland and Labrador .tlantic
.4ccord Implementation .Vcioundland and Labrador Act' -
(provincially) for Newfoundland. and the Canada-,Vova Scotia QOt]/ore
Petroleum Resource. .4, ccord Inplementation .ct'6 (federally) and the
Canada-.\ova Scotia Ofloe Petroleum Resources Accord Iiplementa-
12, The No ,a Scotia agreement is entitled the "Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Rebources
Accord" and was concluded and signed b both governments and bears a date of 26 August 1986
[,\ota Scotia 4ccord. replacing an earlier agreement dating from 19X2 The Newfoundland agree-
ment is called "The Atlantic Accord: \Icmi randum of Agreement between the (ot erment of Canada
and the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador on Otishorv Oil and Gas Resource Manage-
ment and Revenue Sharing" and is dated I I February 1985.
13. As a result of a conflict in the relevant federal legislation dealing with the two offshore re-
gimes, there was a dispute betwveen Newfoundland and Nova Scotia in respect of what area fell
within their respective offshore areas. This area, known as the Laurentian sub-Basin, was the subject
of an arbitration proce.s between the two provinces which concluded in 2012, granting most of the
area to the Newfoundland offshore regime.
14. S.C. 1987, c. 3, as amended.
15. R.S.N.L. 1990. c. C-2.
16. S.C. 1988, c. 28. [Federal ASAccordAcl].
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lion (Nova Soia).h't17 (provincially) for Nova Scotia. While there are
some differences between the two sets of legislative initiatives, overall the
basic cooperative regime established under the two regimes is similar For
simplicity, for the balance of this paper the Nova Scotia Accord and its
Accord Acts will be the focus of attention.
In strict theory, the fiederal Parliament and the Nova Scotia legislature
are each free to amend their respective legislation as they deem fit,
notwithstanding legislative attempts to tie the two regimes together as
closely as possible.'" This unilateral governmental authority gives the joint
approach a somewhat (and largely unexpressed) shaky foundation which
could be destroyed by a new political agenda within either government.
The constitutional basis for the joint approach is also subject to question,
given the clear Supreme Court support for exclusive federal jurisdiction
over the offshore. Therefore the joint approach could result in an unantici-
pated court constitutional challenge in future. However, the viability of
the Accord approach depends on continued reciprocal action on each side.
As time goes by, significant levels of private investment pursuant to the
Accord approach may lessen the prospect for a political challenge to the
joint regime. However, the prospect for a constitutional challenge remains
open, unless the Constitution is amended to deal with the political solution
achieved through the Accords.'"
One other area of possible future stress to the pragmatic resolution
achieved by the Accord Acts is the position of Canada's First Nations in
respect of claims of jurisdiction over offshore areas. At the moment, such
jurisdictional claims are in their infanc%. and the way in which they might
impact, or require changes to. the bilateral coordinated approach evidenced
in the Accords remains to be seen.
It is interesting to note, as outlined in the sister paper of Nathan Evans
published here, that a similar joint legislative approach and joint adminis-
17 S.N S 1987, c. 3. [,VS, cord.lhcIl. The NS4A.c rd.dt and the Federal .\S Atcord.4c1 will
hereinafter be jointly referred to as the VS 4tcortl.4c.
14. Sec. for example, the provision in s. 94) of A. ScordiAcr. .peciA ing that the Canada-Nova
Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board can only be dis.solved b\ joint action. This is also reflective of the
"private agreement" contractual approach seen in the Noa Scotia Accord itself, which again would
require joint agreement to formally amend.
19. The constitutional issues are recognized in Article 42.111 of the Nova Scotia Accord. which
notos a commitment to attempt to achieve a constitutional amendment to entrench the principles in
the Accord. No such amendment has becn made. By contrast, in Au'stralia, as seen in Nathan Evans'
sistcr paper published here, the joint approach in Australia seems better able to accommodate politi-
cal change, as the Commonwealth Government appears able to flex or relax its muscle simply by
redefining the role assigned to the State minister as the federal Designated Authority over such
matters,
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tration has been adopted in Australia, although in that country the well
established jurisdiction of the States over (and property rights in) the terri-
torial sea makes this joint approach more of a necessity. The weight of
political and pragmatic commercial development issues have pushed
Canada to a similar position even though the Canadian Supreme Court
appears to have dealt a better hand to the federal government. However, in
Australia where the relevant State minister is made the Designated
Authority for many federal purposes. on a day-to-day administrative level,
there is today less joint exercise of authority in Australia than we shall see
exists in the comparable Canadian context.
11. .4dminiisttiarion pfi he \oI'a Scotia Offihor ..Irea
The Nova Scotia Accord Acit jointly establish the Canada-Nova Scotia
Offshore Petroleum Board (Board)' with the general power of adminis-
tration and management over the Nova Scotia offshore area.2 According
to the Board's web site. its principal responsibilities include:
" ensuring the safe conduct of offshore operations:
• protection of the environment during offshore petroleum activities:
" management of offshore oil and gas resources:
• review of industrial benefits and employment opportunities:
• issuance of licences for offshore exploration and development;
• resource evaluation, data collection and distribution.--
The Board is a separate entity, with the result that the o\ erall administra-
tive and management functions for the offshore area have been shifted
from the respective government departments at both levels of government.
However, as will be seen belo\N. the Board does involve relevant govern-
ment departments from both sides in respect of its re\ iew processes, as
appropriate. The Board consists of five members. t\\o appointed by each
level of government for a six year, staggered term, with a Chairman who is
appointed jointly.2' Only one member of the Board from each government
20. Federal,VS.4tcord.-It-l, upra note 16 at s. 9(lt, VS..ccordActsuprm note 17 ats. 9(0).
21, Th' .\"SAccordA't.% define the offshore area fiir Nova Scotia by a formal description in Sched-
ules to the Act. As noted .upra note 13. in one area there was a conflict with the Newfoundland
offshore area in respect of the comparable Newfoundland legislation, which has now been resolvcd
b) an arbitration proceeding between the two pro% inces.
22. See the discussion of the Board's mandate a,, listed online; Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Pe-
troleum Board General Information <http:/ www.cnsopb.ns.ca/Generalinfo-gcncral.html>.
23. Federal NS.AccordAcf, supra note 16 at s. II;NMSAccord lv. upna note 17 at s, 10,
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can be employed in their respecti'c public service. " Direct employees of
the Board are not employed as public servants. -"
While the Board has been granted regulatory authority over the
matters noted above, certain aspects of petroleum activities also fall under
the regulatory authority of other agencies N% ithin both levels of govern-
ment. With respect to these other agencies, the Board takes the lead role in
coordinating regulatory activities. When an activity is first proposed to the
Board, it sets up meetings of the various agencies with relevant
jurisdiction to notify them of the proposed activity and to assist the appli-
cants in identifying all the relevant regulatory requirements. In many cases,
the Board has entered into Memoranda of Understanding with the
appropriate departments and agencies to ensure effecti\ e coordination and
to avoid duplication of work and acti\ iti s. It is anticipated that further
Memoranda of Understanding will be forthcoming so as to further enhance
this process.
The exercise of a power or the performance of a duty or function by the
Board is not subject to the review' or approval of either government except
in respect of defined fundamental decisions. -'6 Fundamental decisions
include, amongst others. such matters as requiring an interest owner to
cease activities due to environmental or social problems, issuing a Call for
Bids, issuing interests pursuant to a Call for Bids, issuing production
licenses in certain instances, setting the terms and conditions of explora-
tion licences, drilling orders, production licenses, significant discovery
licenses and subsurface storage licenses, and the approval of a benefits
plan.21 Notice of any fundamental decision made by the Board must be
given to the federal Minister of Natural Resources and provincially to the
Minister responsible for Energy 2' and these Ministers may act jointly to
veto a fundamental decision made by the Board within thirty days of
notification, -' or within sixty days if the period for potential consideration
of the fundamental decision has been extended by notice from either Min-
ister." The provincial Minister alone has the power to veto a Board deci-
sion in respect of a Board approval of the general approach of developing
a pool or field under a development plan, or fundamental decisions in
respect of a Call for Bids, or in respect of interests that are wholly within
24 Ibid at . 11(2) in each Act.
25 Ibid. at s 20(3) in cacti Act.
26. Ibid. at s. 31 in each Act. See Also Nova Scotia Accord, supra note 12 at art. 12.02.
27 Nova Scoia Accord, sullp note 12 at art. 13 02.
28. I~ drl NN. h cordAct, supra note 16 at s. 324 I); .\.4ccord.4ci. supra note 17 at .32(I).
29 Ibid. at s. 351 1 Na) in each Act.
30. Ibid. at s. 34() in each Act.
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the Bay of Fundy area otThhore, or in respect of Sable Island) The federal
Minister has a unilateral veto power over a fundamental decision of the
Board, or can override a provincial Ministerial veto, but only in the event
that the decision in question unreasonably delays the attainment of
security of supply." In the event the Ministers do not exercise their veto
powers within the time limits noted, the decision becomes effective and
should be implemented."
The fundamental decision review process is designed to allow the
federal and provincial governments an overriding ability to review and
control major aspects of the offshore administrative and management
process, while leaving the initial decision in these areas to the independent
Board process. Given the high degree of interaction between the Board
and the relevant government departments in both levels of government,
intervention by the Ministers pursuant to the formal veto powers will likely
be rare. In addition, it is possible for the Ministers to jointly issue direc-
tives to the Board in a number of matters, such as with respect to matters
relating to fundamental decisions and the benefits plans of various appli-
cants, 34 which again will likely reduce the need for formal implementation
of the veto powers.
In certain instances, namely the declaration of a significant discovery
or any amendment or revocation thereof," the issuance of an order to drill,"
the declaration of a commercial discovery or any amendment or revoca-
tion thereof,37 and the reduction of the term of an interest," a party
affected by the decision can request a hearing before a separately consti-
tuted Oil and Gas Committee of the Board. The Board is to consider the
recommendations of the Committee following on from those hearings
before making a decision on the listed mattersY In addition, the Board
may at any time ask the Oil and Gas Committee for a report or recommen-
dation in respect of any question, matter, or thing relating to the conserva-
tion, production, storage, processing or transportation of petroleum."
31. ibid.ats. 35(1b) in each Act
32. Ibid. at s. 35( 1(a) in each Act. Howe~er. see .VSAcc,ird.4ct, supra note 17 at s. 35(3): where
this federal veto power is implemented. the provincial Minister can ask that the National Energy
Board confirm the validity of the situation in respect of secunty of supply.
33. Ibid. at ss. 32 in each Act.
34. Ibid. at ss. 41 ( ! in each Act.
35. Ibid. at s. 74 and s. 77 respectively.
36. Ibid. at s. 79 and s. 82 respectively.
37. Ibid. at s. 81 and s. 94 respectively.
38. Ibid. at s. 82(3) and s. 85(3) respectively.
39. See the Committee provisions ibid. at ss. 127145 and ss. 126138 respectively.
40. Ibid. at s. 151 and s. 144 respectively.
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Subject to the intervention of the Ministers or the Oil and Gas
Committee as outlined above, the Board itself has the authority to issue a
Work Authorization for any work or acti\ ity associated with oil and gas
exploration, development, or production in the Nova Scotia offshore area,4'
as vell as for work activities associated \ ith the construction, installation,
and commissioning of production installations and for decommissioning
and abandonment. liach separate 'Work Authorization is the subject of
specific requirements, all of which are outlined in detail by the Regulatory
Roadmap for Nova Scotia issued by the Atlantic Canada Petroleum Insti-
tute." The Board will review the documents submitted for the relevant
WVork Authorization and consult Nvith a range of interested federal and
provincial departments. including Fisheries and Oceans Canada, the
Canadian Environmental Assessment Agcinc\. Natural Resources Canada,
the NS Department of Environment and Labour, the NS Department of
Fisheries, Transport Canada and the NS Petroleum Directorate. 3
The Board is given the power to conduct a public review in relation to
the e\ercise of any of its duties in an\ case \%here the Board is of the view
that it is in the public interest to do so.' In addition, other government
agencies and departments also hale public review authority and responsi-
bilities. To avoid the prospect of multiple public reviews, the Board has
been able to arrange for a single joint public revew for the Sable Gas
Project. invol\ ing En' ironment Canada, Natural Resources Canada, the
Nova Scotia Department of Environment, the No\ a Scotia Department of
Natural Resources, the National Energy Board and the Board.
4
1
The Board actually has established sex eral committees to assist in its
review of various major areas of interest. One such committee is the Board's
Fisheries and Environmental Advisory Committee (FEAC) which is
comprised of groups having an interest in environmental matters,
representatives of the federal and provincial departments of fisheries and
various Nova Scotian fishing associations, non-governmental agencies and
native groups. Another committee is the Benefits Review Committee, which
is comprised of representatives from the Board, Natural Resources Canada,
41 Ibid. at s. 142(b) and s. 13541l rc'.pctivcl\
42 Atlantic Canada Petroleum Institute & Erlandson & Asociates Consultants, Offshore Oil and
Gas Approu ls in Atlantic Canada: A guide to regulatory approval processes for oil and natural gas
exploration and production in the Nova Scotia Offshore Area - The Regulatory Roadmaps Project
(June 2001) lunpublihcdl INoa Scotia Regulatory Roadmap].
43 Ibid. at 1-4.
44. Federal \S.IhcordAc. supra note 16 at,, 44. NSA(wcrdAct, supra note 17 at s, 44,
45 Scv the Board )erision Rclorts in respect of the Sable Offshore Energy Project online: Canada-
No\a Scotia (Ol'.hore Petroleum Board http: vwvv,Acnsopns.ca/> at s. !.0,5 [SOEP Decision),
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the NS Petroleum Directorate and such other government agencies and
departments as may be appropriate. The Committee reviews and comments
on any required Canada-Nova Scotia Benefits Plan, and confers regularly
for the purpose of consultations regarding ongoing activities associated
with benefits matters. This Committee helps meet the requirement in the
legislation that the Board consult with the Ninisters as to the extent to
which the Benefits Plan meets %' ith legislated requirements.
The issuance of a Work Authorization by the Board is not a one-stop
shop approval. Depending on the nature of the work, other licenses, per-
mits, approvals or authorizations from other government departments and
agencies may be required. These can include, amongst others, a Canadian
Environmental Assessment Agency Determination, a Fisheries Act Autho-
rization, a Disposal at Sea Permit, and where onshore activities will be
necessary, various provincial approvals and permits."
Having explored the framework in place for administration of the off-
shore area, it is now possible to turn to the issue of howa sustainable devel-
opment is achieved, either through this cooperative mechanism itself, or
through federal approa als that run parallel to the formal administrative
structure. To do so. the paper will focus on four specific areas:
1. The Canada-Nova Scotia Benefits Plan requirements
2. Environmental Asses-ment requirements
3. Fisheries protection requirements
4. Marine Protected Area.
I1. The Canada-.ova Scotia Bnefits Plan
The provinces of Nova Scotia and Nea foundland are clearly economi-
cally disadvantaged areas of Canada. One of the predominant political
motivations in respect of fostering sustainable development of the offshore
area is the desire to ensure that this region can benefit economically from
offshore exploration and production activity. This would allow the Atlan-
tic region itself to be sustainably developed so as to reduce its economic
dependence on cash transfers from the more wealthy provinces. While it is
important to ensure that the region's existing and historically important
industries (such as fisheries and tourism) are not damaged by the offshore
activity (issues which will be addressed in later parts of this paper), one of
the key objectives of the joint regime established under the cooperative
46. Nova Scotia Regulatory Roadmap ,supra note 42 at 1-5.
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federalism represented in the Accords is to ensure local economic benefit.
This is achieved through the requirement for operators, in order to obtain
the work authorizations they need for exploration or development work, to
file and obtain approval of well defined Benefits Plans in the affected
province. Again, this paper will focus on the Nova Scotia provisions.
A "Canada-Nova Scotia benefits plan":
means a plan for the employment of Canadians. and, in particular, members
of the labour force of the Province and, ... for providing manufacturers,
consultants, contractors and scr- ice companies in the Province and other
parts of Canada Nsith a full and fair opportunity to participate on a
competitive basis in the supply of goods, and services used in any proposed
w ork or activity referred to in the benefits plan.4"
The need for a Benefits Plan can be dispensed with, but only with the
consent of both Ministers," and the Ministers can also become involved in
terms of issuing directives in respect of such plans." Clearly it is intended
that Nova Scotians should have priority to economic benefit over other
Canadians. There are in fact four separate aspects of provincial benefit
which need to be addressed in Nova Scotia Benefit Plans:50
I. the applicant should be committed, before carrying out any work or
activity in the offshore area, to establishing an office in Nova Scotia,
where appropriate levels oftcision-making take place (emphasis
added);
2. individuals resident in Nova Scotia shall be given first consider-
ation for training and employment in the work to which the Plan
relates (and collective agreements entered into by the applicant
should allow for this to apply). This extends to the need for specific
succession plans for the replacement of individuals in positions
initially held by non-Canadians:
3. to ensure that local residents become qualified for appropriate
positions at all levels of employment, there should be a defined
47. Fe dt-ral NS Itcord.4,.,supra note 16at s 45411; \S.4tcord.4,t. supm note 17 ats. 45(l).
48 Ibid. at s. 4541fl(b) in each Act.
4Y Ibid ats 41(1)in cach Act
5W1 Ibid. at s. 453) in each Act.
51. See Guidelines entitled "Industrial Benefits and Employment Plan - Nova Scotia Offshore
Area ( I9-4. 15 p,)" online: Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board <http:i/www.cnsopbns.ca/
Sat s. 5.4 [Plan Guidelines).
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educational and training programme specified, as well as research
and development activities in Nova Scotia;
4. first consideration should be given to serN ices provided from within
Nova Scotia and to goods locally manufactured, provided those
services and goods are competitive in terms of fair market price.
quality and delivery.
In order to be resident of Nova Scotia for these purposes. an individual
must be a Canadian citizen or landed immigrant \ ho has resided in Nova
Scotia for the immediately preceding six months prior to project hiring,
and for corporations, the entity must have an operating office duly regis-
tered for provincial business and must have controlling shareholders
resident in the province. To be a resident of Canada, an individual must be
Canadian born and not have relinquished his or her Canadian citizenship,
or be a landed immigrant. To be a Canadian corporation, the entity must
have an operating office registered somewhere in Canada and hae
controlling shareholders who qualifr as Canadian residents (as defined
above) .52 In addition, the Board is given the power to require that the
applicant include provisions in the Benefits Plan to ensure that disadvan-
taged individuals and groups have access to training and employment
opportunities, and for such individuals and for companies controlled by
such individuals to participate in the supply of needed goods and services."
The legislative philosophy in respect of these provisions has been de-
scribed by the Board as follows:
It is important that those with an interest in this matter understand ... that
the Accord Implementatim Acts do not require targets or quotas for Nova
Scotian or Canadian participation in otTshore projects. As the Panel stated,
the legislation 'is not based on an interventionist philosophy of mandatory
requirements or rigid commitments." Rather. the Accrd InplemIentation
Acts put in place requirements that the Proponents give Nova Scotians
and other Canadians a full and fair opportunity to participate on a
competitive basis as well as providing first consideration to Nova
Scotians, 4
In order to assess the commitment of the applicant to local benefits in the
four categories noted above, the applicant needs to provide a host of infor-
52. Ibid. atss. I I(f)& .1(g).
53. Federal NSAccord.4l, supa note 16 at s. 45(4, NS.4ccordAc1, ,uptv note 17 at s 45141.
54. SOEP Decision, supra note 45 at s. 2.1.1.
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mation in any Benefits Plan submitted, the key elements of which have
been summarized as follows:
" a sufficiently comprehensive description to provide a broad over-
view of the work proposed;
" an estimate of the projects demands for goods and services, by
phase, for each of the major components in terms of quantities,
values, timing and probable sources:
* forecasts of total program expenditures and direct employment
created by major component, by region, and by year;
* an assessment of the economic impact of each phase of the project;
" a summary of opportunities associated with the project;
• a description of the specific initiatives proposed which are directed
to maximizing the benefits accruing to Canada and Nova Scotia;
• an identification of the nature and number of positions to be
initially filled by foreign nationals:
• an outline of plans and expenditures that are to be made for
research and development, and education and training within the
province: and
* the Operator shall ensure that its major contractors adopt the indus-
trial benefits obligations of the Operator for ensuring full and fair
access and maximizing industrial benefits opportunities in all
subcontracting activities.""
While the Plan is a technical requirement for all work authorization appli-
cations submitted to the Board, effectively, there are only two Plan
requirements. The first relates to work authorizations for exploratory
activity - this Plan will generally be less extensive due to the smaller size
of the work force normally engaged in these activities. A second, more
extensive Plan needs to be filed and approved when an application is made
in the context of a Development Application. It is this second Plan which,
if approved, wvill cover all work authorizations for development and
production activities.
The Board recommends that operators maintain an open consultation
with the Board and relevant government departments in respect of the
development of any Plan. As noted above, the Board has established a
Benefits Review Committee to assist in respect of issues relating to
Benefit Plans. Once a Plan is submitted and approved, the Board requires
55, Nova Scotia Regulatory Roadmap, supra note 42 at 1-7 & 1-8, summarizing the Plan Guide-
lines, supra notc 5 1,
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the applicant to introduce an eftfcti e monitoring and reporting process to
match the reality against the submissions made in the Plan. In particular,
operators must file a report within 90 days of completion of each major
component of a project. This specific *'end of project" report can be waived
if a system of semi-annual and annual reports on ongoing progress in meet-
ing the commitments of a Plan are instituted.5 6
The Board, in granting approval of a Plan, can impose conditions in
respect of the approval. In respect of the approval of the Sable Offshore
Energy project, some thirteen conditions were made in respect of that Plan,
including:5'
I. The need to submit. within specified time frames, detailed Employ-
ment and Training Plans, and Research and Development Plans.
These conditions w ere designed to o~ercome certain general
commitments made in the original application. Quarterly reporting
against the final approvals in these areas %as also required.
2. To help address possible disadvantages for local companies in
respect of international competitiveness due to lack of experience,
the Proponents were required to establish a programme satisfac-
tor% to the Board to promote the effective transfer of technology
from the Proponents. their Alliance Partners and major contractors
to Nova Scotian and other Canadian individuals and companies,
Technology transfer included encouraging and facilitating the
formation of joint ventures and licensing agreements.
3. The Proponents were to consider Canada-Nova Scotia content when
e~aluating bids. Where bids were otherwise equal, the bid contain-
ing the highest level of Canada-Nova Scotia content was to be
selected. If Nova Scotian and other Canadian suppliers were seen
as not being competitive or had failed to qualify to bid, the Propo-
nent was to advise them and the Board of the deficiencies and short-
comings for purposes of future bidding.
4. The Proponents, Alliance Partners and their major contractors were
to examine ways of providing local suppliers, contractors and
personnel with long-term contracts and employment, not just in
56. For the specific consultation, monitoring and reporting requrements, se Plan Guidelines, u-
pro note 51 at s. 8.
57. SOEP Decision, supra note 45.
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respect of this project, but also in respect of other Canadian and
international projects, which could count towards local content.
5. For contracts in excess of S250,000, lists of pre-qualified contrac-
tors. bidders lists and proposed final contract awards were to be
made to the Board to allow it to assess whether the Proponents
wcrc meeting the full and fair opportunity and first consideration
requirements for locals.
(i. Estimates of Canadian and Nova Scotia content on various parts of
the projct were included in the Plan. The Board required that in
the event that the actual content fell below the estimates, the short-
fall was to be justified and appropriate measures were to be identi-
fied to enhance future local content.
These conditions give a good indication of the significance of the Benefit
Plan to the approval process and show that it is clearly the key component
in meeting the objective of sustainable development of the local
economics.
I V Enviroimental.4 se.ssment Requirements
.s one would expect in the oil and gas industry, environmental safeguards
form a key component of sustainable development. To deal with this
aspect of its mandate, the Board niav require an applicant for any work
authorization to prepare and submit both an Environmental Impact State-
ment (EIS) and an Environmental Protection Plan (EPP). A comprehensive
E IS and EPP must be filed at the time of making a Development Applica-
tion, and these documents will normally cover work effected during the
development and production stages until a Production Operations Autho-
rization (POA) is required. At that stage. the EIS'EPP must be formally
appivved by the Board before a POA authorization is given.5
The EIS is generally expected to include:
" details of the proposed energy source;
* a description of substances which will be discharged into the marine
environment during the normal course of operations;
" details of fishing acti\ itics that are ongoing in the area of the fieldwork;
and
5X. See Nmna Scotia Regulatory Roadmap. supra note 42 at i-1i & 1-12.
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* plans for co-ordinating the program %%ith fishing interests in the area.
As one might expect, the EPP goes on to set out the measures suggested by
the Applicant to protect the environment during its operations. In the
context of the comprehensive Plan required for development and produc-
tion activities, the EPP should include:
" a description of the program established to monitor and the measures
adopted to minimize or mitigate the effect on the natural environment
of routine operations on production installation.
* contingency plans for response to, and mitigation of, the accidental spill
of petroleum or hazardous substances:
" a description of equipment and procedures for treatment, handling and
disposal of vaste material:
* compliance monitoring programs to ensure that the composition of
spilled \Naste material is in accordance \% ith the limits specified in the
environmental protection plan.
" a summary of the chemical substances intended for use in operations
and maintenance on the production installation.
* plans for environmental restoration of the production site following
termination of production."'
To assist both the Board and Applicants in terms of environmental assess-
ments, the Board has adopted a class assessment for seismic exploration
on the Scotian Shelf. This applies to requests submitted to undertake 2D
and 3D seismic surveys using airguns or airgun arrays in respect of the
Shelf, and is valid for five \ cars and for an operating period between April
I and October 3 1.1 A similar generic assessment is being considered for
exploration drilling on the Scotian Shelf, which identifies and assesses
potential environmental effects of drilling, identifies generic mitigation
measures and operating conditions. and identifies the environmental
assessment requirements for indi% idual wells. In other w ords, it identifies
the common components of exploration drilling and outlines a methodol-
ogy and information source for individual assessments, allowing each
particular EPP to focus on the specifics of each individual well within that
general framework.'
The above outlines the specific requirements of the Board, which as
59. ibid. at p. 1-1.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid. atp. 2-8.
62. Ibid. at p. 3-9.
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noted is itself a manifestation of cooperative federalism. In addition to the
Board requirements, there is significant overlap amongst various
provincial and federal agencies and departments in this area. Legislative
jurisdiction over the environment is not specifically addressed in the
Canadian Constitution, with the result that both levels of government have
jurisdiction in their respective legislative areas to regulate environmental
issues. As noted in Nathan Evans' sister paper, in Australia, where the
Commonwealth Government has recently acknowledged and exercised its
environmental jurisdiction, this is an area of current conflict which will
require resolution in that jurisdiction, while in Canada it appears to be
subject to coordinated management under the Accord approach. Coordi-
nation of the competing agencies in Canada is partly addressed through
the establishment of the Board's FEAC Committee, outlined above. In
addition, in a number of cases. a formal Environmental Assessment under
the ('anadian EnvironmentalAs.Nes.Npienit4cf'; may have to be undertaken.
This Act is currently in the process of fundamental and formal amend-
ments by the Government of Canada." but in any event the complex and
formal structure of assessments under that legislation is beyond the scope
of this paper."5
The oxerlapping jurisdiction inherent in this area gives rise to the
prospect of multiple environmental revieNs and assessments having to be
prepared, carrying with it the risk of protracted and costly legal battles
over jurisdictional issues -- prospects which were sure to lessen develop-
ment interest by private investors, As a result, this has been a key area in
which cooperative federalism has been able to fashion a possible solution.
For example, under the CE.-, joint review panels can be constituted on a
case-by-case basis," and the Federal Minister of the Environment is
permitted to enter into agreements with the provinces or conclude arrange-
ments for assessment processes." Furthermore, as we have seen, the NS
Accord Acts mandate the Board to avoid duplication of work and activi-
ties and to conclude memoranda of understanding in respect of environ-
mental regulation." A Memorandum of Understanding has been concluded
between the Board and Environment Canada, and one is in draft form, but
63. S.C. 1992, c 37 [('EAA.J
h4 Bill C-Y, 4n A.t to amend the Canadian EmAcnnentaIJ|...~mnwt .. t, 2" Sess., 370 Pad.,
2003 O.s,,nted to I I June, 2113 i.
h5 Uor a general o% cr% iev of this legislative scheme as it emists under the current Act, see the
Nova Stia Regulatory Roadmap, supra note 42 at Ch. I5.
66. Supra note 63 at s. 40
07. Ibid. at s. 5XI I (c).
68. /t.ckdnd N. .4rcord Act. supra note 16 at s 46(1); .S Acon 4ct. .upra note 17 at s. 50(t).
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subject to revision, with the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. In
addition, there has in fact been a joint review panel for the Nova Scotia
offshore area under the CE.4,4, In 1997, the Sable Gas Project, a proposal
for an offshore natural gas development in Nova Scotia, was conducted
jointly with the National Energy Board, the Board, and the Ministers of
Natural Resources and the Environment for Canada and for the Province
of Nova Scotia." A similar joint effort involving the Newfoundland Board,
and the federal and provincial governments was undertaken for the Terra
Nova Development Project in Newfoundland.
This kind of joint action is not without its problems. These include the
delays that are inherent in establishing the process for the cooperative
assessment and negotiating and concluding the agreement with respect
thereto; dealing with potentially conflicting procedural requirements; and
ensuring the re'iew authority is properly mandated under each of the
relevant legislative regimes.-' After a review of the trend toward
cooperative assessments and the problems that still exist with them, one
commentator reviews in detail the stress inherent in the cooperative
approach and concludes:
In summary, the benefits of "one window" assessment, which include the
possible avoidance of jurisdictional concerns, the completeness of
environmental impact assessments and the avoidance of interjurisdictional
duplication and overlap, are clear. However, it is likely too early to
determine if those benefits can be fully realized in light of some of the
impediments to success.
With time, a number of the present problems with cooperative assessment
processes may be addressed. The greater use of cooperative environmental
assessment processes by federal and provincial departments and agencies
can result in the establishment of process -precedents" which will reduce
the time and resources required by the parties to initiate the process. If
that occurs, the use of cooperative environmental assessment processes
will likely increase and the concerns of proponents about the time required
to implement new processes may diminish, The need to ensure that new
processes do not violate the rules of natural justice or the statutory
requirements of the cooperating federal and provincial departments or
69. "Review of the Canadian Em'in, gal.e. .nlent4c: A Discussion Paper for Public Con-
sultation". December 1999, online: Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency <http:/t
www.ceaagc.ca, 3/0l/01)0f(2 0001indexe.htm -.
70, See a discussion of these and other issues in Judith Hanebury, Q.C., "('ooperative Environ-
mental Assessments: Their Increasing Role in Oil and Gas Projects" (Spring, 2001) 24 Dalhousie
L.J. 87.
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agencies will continue. but the cffort necessary to accomplish this objective
can be minimali/cd. This can ccur as a result of the increased experience
that \ nill come as a result of the greater use -itsuch mechanisms. As well,
some legislatiN c amendments may bc required to smooth out conflicting
statutor. overlaps. Finally. while such cooperative assessment mechanisms
iay as old jurisdictional friction points and therefore reduce the risk of
legal challenge of an environmental assessment on the hasis of
constitutional issues it should not be forgotten that it may increase the
number of legal challenges of the cooperative environmental assessment
processes utilized. Parties unhappy with a substantive environmental
decision and frustrated by the courts' deference tow\ard such decisions,
maN increasingly look to procedural issues as a method to o,*crtum the
decision. The case law on jurisdictional friction points related to
environmental impact assessment may be replaced by case law that
examines procedural friction points.-
V. Fisheries Priaection Requimlments
There is little constitutional oNerlap in respect of jurisdiction over fisher-
ies in the offshore area as the Canadian Constitution gives the federal
government jurisdiction over sea coast and inland fisheries.12 The situa-
tion is less clear in respect of fisheries jurisdiction in the Bay of Fundy and
certain provincial bays-" \hich may have formed part of a province at the
time of confederation. Notvithstanding this slight ambiguity, it is
generally the federal goernment, acting through the Department of Fish-
cries and Oceans, which has overall responsibility for economic. ecologi-
cal and scientific interest in the ocean area offshore the east coast of Canada.
While the provincial governments also have involved Departments of
Fisheries in the coordination process outlined above. the provincial
departments in question have a mandate to supervise, develop and
promote the processing and marketing of the fishing industry within their
respective boundaries. As a result, the operation of cooperative federalism
in this area is largely one of coordination between the Boards and the other
relevant federal players in this area.
As a result, the Nova Scotia Regulatory Roadmap indicates that in
appropriate circumstances, entities seeking work authorisations from the
Board may be required to obtain approvals from the federal Department of
71, IhNd. at 1417-O ,
72. ( "w ivm t .s n . i. '. eu1tr note I ats. 91112.
73. Aldo Chircop & Bruce A. Marchand "( ccman Act Uncharted Seas for Offshore Development
in Atlantic Canada?" (Spring, 24)(111 24 Dalhousie LJ 23 at 33 (Chircop & Marchand].
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Fisheries and Occans.? To further the efforts in respect of joint coordina-
tion, and as noted above, a draft Memorandum of Understanding has been
formulated with the federal Department and the Board in Nova Scotia, and
one has been concluded amongst the Newfoundland Board, the Federal
Department of Fisheries and Oceans, the Department of Energy, Mines &
Resources and the Newfoundland Department of Energy and its Intergov-
ernmental Affairs SecretariatC5
One of the key links between sustainability of fisheries and offshore
oil and gas development is a provision in the Fiheriv. cli which provides
that -'no person shall carry on anN work or undertaking that results in harmful
alteration, disruption or destruction of fish habitat,'b" This section creates
an offence for which a substantial fine may be imposed. To the extent that
an operator is concerned that exploration or development activities might
infringe this section, it can seek an authorization under s. 35(2) of the Act,
in which case no contravention will exist. However, an authorization here
will not permit activities which would result in the deposition of deleteri-
ous substances into the ocean.-_
One needs to be concerned with these provisions when the activities in
question NN ill take place in an area in which a fish habitat exists. "Fish
habitat" is defined as -'spawning grounds and nursery. rearing, food
supply and migration areas on which fish depend directly or indirectly in
order to carry out their life processes." ' If there is such a presence, and the
activities may result in harmful alteration, disruption or destruction of that
habitat, " then the Department of Fisheries and Oceans has a hierachy of
options for dealing with the danger.'
1. Project relocation. The Department prefers to maintain natural habi-
tats due to the complexity of factors which create such habitats. In
cases where the project represents substantial risk to critical habi-
tats (such as species survival). where the habitat's productive
74. See for cample the ,autements to this effect in Nova Scotia Regulatory Roadmap. supra note
42 at 1-5.
75. Atlantic Canada Petroleum Institute & l.rlandson & Amic.itats consultants. OibhMre Oil and
Ga Appriwlsi n 4tdantic Canada iuidk 6 r4V gnuhcv# apprrul p mrmcv~ sijr oil and naturalw%
exploration and production in the v\'e lbiundland Olvhore Area - The Regulatoty Roadmaups Pm jva
(June 2001) at A-16 [unpublished] [Newfoundland Regulatory Roadmap].
76, FisheriesAct, R.S.C. 1985. c. F- 14, s. 35 11 L
77. Ibid. s. 3W3). Certain deposits are permitted by regulation under s. 36(4
78. Ibid. s. 34( 1.
79. For a review of the factors ofconcern in this aspect, *,c the Ni\ a Scotia Regulatory Ruaidmap.
supra note 42 at 16-4 & 16-5.
80. Ibid. at p. 16-5.
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capacity is high, or needed for critical stages of a fish species,
relocation is clearly the preferred option;
2. Project redesign is the next option if relocation is not possible;
3. Mitigation of adverse impacts appears to be the fall back where
relocation or redesign are not possible. If the impact of a project
can be fully mitigated, an authorization is not needed and the
Department will issue a Letter of Advice to this effect." Mitigation
measures can include setting time windows for work or re-arrang-
ing or compressing work schedules, selecting the least harmful of
equipment, materials and methods, etc.
In the event that none of these options is viable, a s. 35(2) authorization
should be obtained, and in this event, a CEAA4 environmental assessment is
triggered. An authorization w ill generally be granted only if the harmful
effects can be "compensated." Any authorization granted will contain terms
and conditions to deal with the compensation aspects of the approval and
the Department will require the applicant to enter into a Compensation
Agreement, The Nova Scotia Regulatory Roadmap describes the list of
options, in order of preference, for developing these Compensation
Agreements:
" create similar habitat at or near the development site within the same
ecological unit;
" create similar habitat in a different ecological unit that supports the
same stock or species:
" increase the productive capacity of existing habitat at or near the
deN elopment site and within the same ecological unit;
" increase the productive capacity of a different ecological unit that
supports the same stock or species; and/or
* increase the productive capacity of existing habitat for a different stock
or different species of fish either on or off site' 2
8 I, Ibd. at p. 16-6
82 lid, at p. 16-7.
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VI. Aarine P vwctd.4tva.s
While the topic of Marine Protected Areas is not an issue in the context of
the subject of sustainable development through cooperative federalism, no
paper on the topic of sustainable development in the east coast offshore
area w ould be complete without a reference to this concept. Under the
Occans Act, a Marine Protected Area is an area of the sea (encompassing
inland waters, the territorial sea and the economic zone) which has been
designated for special protection for one or more of the following reasons:
(a) the conservation and protection of commercial and non-commercial
fishery resources, including marine mammals and their habitats
(b) the conservation and protection of endangered or threatened marine
species and their habitats:
(c the conservation and protection of unique habitats:
(d) the conservation and protection of marine areas of high biodivcrsity
or biological productivit': and
(e) the conservation and protection of any other marine resource or habitat
as is necessan' to fulfil the mandate of the Minister.""'
The Minister is given the mandate. in the context of the de'elopment of
integrated management plans, to lead and coordinate the development and
implementation of a national system of marine protected areas."
Management plans for such areas can limit or prohibit oil and gas activi-
ties therein, or may include use restrictions and specify buffer zones. It is
likely that the "preservation of the ecosystem will be paramount where
proposed uses or conflicting uses would add an unacceptable risk to the
ecosystem. " "
No area on the east coast has yet been designated such an area, but
there are areas that have been designated as areas of interest. Gilbert Bay,
Labrador and Eastport, Newfoundland, have been so designated,' as has
the Sable Gully in Nova Scotia." It has been reported that the Department
83. OceansAct, S.C. 1996, c. 31, s. 35(l).
84. Ibid. at s. 35(2). This need is reemphasized in the recently released document "Canada's Ocean
Strategy" online: Fisheries and Oceans Canada - Canadian Waters <http:/!wwwdfo.mpo.gc.cat
canwaters-eauxcan/indcx.htmil>.
85. Chircop & Marchand, supra note 73 at 45
86. Newfoundland Regulatory Roadmap, supra note 75 at 1-4.
87. Nova Scotia Regulatory Roadmap, supra note 42 at 1-5.
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of Fisheries and Oceans intends to have the Gully designated a Marine
Protected Area in 2002"" with a draft management plan anticipated for the
summer," ' although this now appear, premature. In the meantime, the Gully
is off limits for seismic and drilling acti ity. although areas close to the
Gully have been ]cased.'"
The Sable Gully is located approximately 200 kilometres off the main-
land of Nova Scotia, east of Sable Island. It is a steep walled canyon some
70 kilometres long and 20 kilometres wide, and with a depth of up to two
kilometres. It has a rich marine life, including deep sea corals and a popu-
lation of northern bottlenose NN hales. Certain fishing practices pose a threat
to both the whales and the deep sea coral, and the oil and gas industry does
likeN ise - the noise from drilling and support ship activity can be a
problem for the whales (and dolphins), and the discharge of drilling muds
and produced water is of concern to corals, whales and other marine life in
this unique habitat.
If the area is designated a Marine Protected Area, the details of the
management plan lbr the area i il define whether any oil and gas develop-
ment N ill be permitted in the area. and as noted abo% e, could even result in
certain restrictions in adjacent areas. It is po.ssible that interests or licenses
might alreadN have been granted to companies for such adjacent areas,
and there is a danger that the restrictions imposed in the context of protec-
tion of the Gully could restrict or curtail current rights, or increase the
anticipated cost, of pursuing planned activities under licenses and rights
already granted. The current licensing regimes make no assurances, and
do not provide for compensation or recourse for such changes," and there-
fore the proposed management plan will be watched with interest by those
companies wvhich have acquired rights under the regulatory regimes in
adjacent areas. As can be seen in the sister paper by Nathan Evans pub-
lished here, Australia's Ocean Policy has committed to removing the re-
striction there on establishing marine protected areas in areas where there
are pre-existing lease rights, with the result that there too protection will
be paramount to the economic interest of industry.
8XX Jerry I.ockett, "Sable (illy. Environmentalist have high hopes that the government will fi-
naill declare this ol|\horc cxiim a protected area", taifa ('hmnick Heruld2t January 24102) El.
XY "tUnderm atcr ilImen, Wil Ottawa pri)tect a unique marine habitat?" Maclean v (22 April 2X02141,
90 1cktll, mupro note 88.
91. Chircop & Marchand, supra note 73 at 46,
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(oclusion
Constitutional power over the east coast oll'shore area appears to rest \vith
the federal go% ernment. Notwithstanding the sole and exclusive nature of
this power, provincial jurisdiction over aiicillarN operational activities and
strong political pressures have resulted in a significant coopcrative effort
bet\\%cen the tw"o levels of go\ ernment in respect of the regulation of oil
and gas development in the area -- cooperation which has allowed private
investment to begin to operate offshore in a cost effective manner. The key
regulatory body established to o- ersee this development is a joint federal-
provincial initiative. which in turn, where necessary, liaises and helps co-
ordinate the interaction vith other government agencies and departments
in both levels of government. Joint pragmatic solutions, such as the com-
mittee approach adopted by the Board to help coordinate input from vari-
ous regulators charged \\ith aspect, of sustainable dex elopment, and the
establishment of joint review panels such as wvas achieved vith the CEA.4
indicate the extent of the success of the process to date. However, the in-
dustry and its cooperati\ c regulatory regime are still in relative infancy,
and time is needed to determine if this pragmatic and cooperative federal-
ism \vill withstand the usual inter-eo\ ernmental friction and the dichotomy
of exclusive powers inherent in Canadian fe.deralism, the vet to be formu-
lated or delimited jurisdictional status of First Nations in the offshore area,
and political change in any level of government involved in the adminis-
tration of the respective joint areas.

